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DROPPING  THE  BALL:  THE  FAILURE  OF  THE
NCAA  TO  ADDRESS  CONCUSSIONS
IN COLLEGE FOOTBALL
K. Adam Pretty*
“Football isn’t a contact sport—it’s a collision sport.  Dancing is a contact
sport.” –Duffy Daugherty, head football coach at Michigan State University,
1954–19721
INTRODUCTION
On August 22, 2011 Derek Sheely, a starting fullback on the football
team at Frostburg State University, a 4755-student National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association (NCAA) Division III school,2 collapsed on the practice field
after sustaining a blow to the head during full contact preseason drills.3
Despite the best efforts of doctors to relieve the swelling in his brain, Sheely
remained in a coma for six days before passing away.4  Sheely’s head injury
occurred while participating in what is known as an “Oklahoma drill,” where
the fullback and linebacker are aligned on opposite sides of the ball and
collide at full speed.5  A common exercise in the first few weeks of practice at
the high school and college levels, the Oklahoma drill is often used by
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.A. Miami University,
2011.  I am grateful to Professors Jeff Pojanowski and Mark McKenna for their guidance
and insight.  I would also like to thank my family and friends for their love and support, as
well as the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their efforts in editing this work.  This
Note is dedicated to my parents, as thanks for all they have done to help me reach where I
am today.
1 THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF FOOTBALL WISDOM (Niels Aaboe ed., 2013).
2 Undergraduate Admissions, FROSTBURG STATE UNIV., http://www.frostburg.edu/un
grad/admiss/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
3 Dan Diamond, A Head Injury in Practice Killed Derek Sheely.  Is the NCAA To Blame?,
FORBES (Sept. 2, 2013, 7:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/2013/09/
02/a-head-injury-in-practice-killed-derek-sheely-is-the-ncaa-to-blame/.
4 Nathan Fenno, Death of Frostburg State Player Derek Sheely Due to ‘Egregious Misconduct,’
Lawsuit Says, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/
aug/22/death-frostburg-state-player-derek-sheely-due-egre/print/.
5 Id.
2359
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coaches to determine which players are not afraid to hit.6  “What the
[Oklahoma] drill . . . showed was something simpler than technique or lever-
age . . . . It showed who had a hard nose for contact and, more importantly,
who didn’t.”7  However, the Oklahoma drill is now rarely used at the profes-
sional level, and many commentators have been sharply critical of what such
drills actually accomplish, as in many situations, “[i]t’s not even about win-
ning a one-on-one.  It’s just about slamming into each other.”8
According to a wrongful death complaint filed by Sheely’s family against
the university, as well the NCAA and the team trainer, Sheely’s head had
begun bleeding profusely at least four separate times over three days of
preseason practice.9  The team trainer treated Sheely’s injuries by applying a
bandage to his forehead and returning him to practice, allegedly without
examining Sheely to determine if he might have a concussion.10  During
practice, Frostburg State running backs coach Jamie Schumacher purport-
edly encouraged his players to “lead with your head” and to hit “hat first,”
reprimanding those players who refused to comply.11  After one drill, Sheely
allegedly complained to Schumacher that he “‘didn’t feel right’ and had a
‘headache,’”12 to which the coach responded by yelling, “[s]top your bitch-
ing and moaning and quit acting like a pussy and get back out there
Sheely!”13  Other players alleged that teammates who reported or com-
plained about injuries were treated as “gripers,” and were often forced to
clean the practice field as punishment for complaining about their injuries.14
All of these alleged actions constitute drastic violations of the medical com-
munity’s advocated best practices on concussion management.15
6 Ron Borges, Today’s Players Don’t Know the Drill, BOS. GLOBE (July 29, 2006), http://
www.boston.com/sports/football/patriots/articles/2006/07/29/todays_players_dont_
know_the_drill/.
7 Id.
8 David Steele, ‘Oklahoma’ Drill Used by Bengals is Dangerous and Archaic, SPORTING NEWS
(last updated Aug. 29, 2013, 7:08 PM), http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2013-07-
30/bengals-oklahoma-drill-concussions-chris-nowinski-mike-brown (quoting Chris Nowin-
ski, a co-founder of Boston University’s Center for the Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy
and a former college football player).
9 See Fenno, supra note 4.
10 Id.
11 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12 Id.
13 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 See Frederick O. Mueller & Bob Colgate, Annual Survey of Football Injury Research
1931–2012, NAT’L CTR. FOR CATASTROPHIC SPORT INJURY RESEARCH 7–9 (2013), available at
http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/2012FBInj.pdf. See generally Amy W. Doolan et al., A
Review of Return to Play Issues and Sports-Related Concussion, 40 ANNALS BIOMEDICAL ENG’G 106
(2012) (discussing the medical concerns behind returning an athlete to play too soon after
a head injury); Kevin M. Guskiewicz, When Treating Sport Concussion, Check the Boxes, But Also
Go the Extra Mile, 48 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 441 (2013) (asserting that trainers must go
beyond a simple checklist when treating concussions); Robert C. Lynall et al., Concussion-
Assessment and -Management Techniques Used by Athletic Trainers, 48 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 844
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In December 2011, Kristen Sheely wrote a letter to NCAA President
Mark Emmert regarding the death of her son, in which she asked for the
NCAA’s support in investigating the circumstances of Sheely’s death.16  The
NCAA responded by stating that while “[p]art of the NCAA’s core mission is
to provide student-athletes with a competitive environment that is safe[,] . . .
each school is responsible for the welfare of its student-athletes.”17  The
response letter also noted, “[u]nfortunately, neither the NCAA nor any other
organization can take the risk completely out of contact sports.”18  To this
point, the NCAA has not investigated further into the death of Derek Sheely.
Current NCAA bylaws mandate that member institutions maintain a concus-
sion policy on file.19  However, the NCAA only reviews the substance of each
school’s policy to determine if it meets the basic requirements of the bylaws.
Further, the NCAA does not conduct oversight to ensure that member
schools actually enforce or carry out their concussion policies.
As highlighted by Derek Sheely’s tragic story, the NCAA has a great
amount of work left to do in the regulation and management of head inju-
ries.  Its failure to properly regulate concussions has already exposed the
NCAA to litigation, and will likely result in future court battles as more for-
mer college football players come forward to bring suits against the NCAA
and its member institutions.  Although the problem of head injuries is not
unique to football, it is by far the sport in which concussions are most preva-
lent.20  This Note focuses specifically on head injuries in college football.
The issue of concussions in other college sports, although outside the scope
of this Note, is certainly worthy of attention, and many of the policy adapta-
tions recommended herein may be applicable to improving the regulation of
head injuries by the NCAA in other sports.
Part I of this Note will examine the medical history of concussions, and
the growing link between concussions suffered by football players and the
development of long-term head injuries.  Part II will discuss factors that exac-
erbate the concussion problem in football, as well as examine how the head
(2013) (discussing current concussion management techniques); Ashley Murphy et al.,
Concussion Evaluation Methods Among Washington State High School Football Coaches and Athletic
Trainers, 4 PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. 419 (2012) (evaluating awareness of concussion assess-
ment methods).
16 Letter from Kristin L. Sheely, Exec. Dir., The Derek Sheely Found., to Mark
Emmert, NCAA Pres. (Dec. 30, 2011), available at http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/
?p=1067.
17 Letter from David Klossner, NCAA Dir. of Health and Safety, to Kristin Sheely,
Exec. Dir., The Derek Sheely Found. (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://nflconcussionliti
gation.com/?p=1067.
18 Id.
19 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2013–2014 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 3,
§ 3.2.4.17 (2013).
20 See Report of Robert C. Cantu, M.A., M.D., F.A.C.S., F.A.C.S.M. at 58, Arrington v.
NCAA, No. 11-cv-06356 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013) [hereinafter Report of Robert C. Cantu].
NCAA injury surveillance found more concussions occurred in football from 2004 to 2009
than in all other fall sports combined. Id.
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injury issue is being addressed by the NCAA, the National Football League
(NFL), and state legislatures.  Part III will examine the NCAA’s duty to pro-
tect student-athlete safety in light of the ongoing litigation against the NCAA,
specifically the potential scope of legal liability for head injuries.  Part IV will
focus on what steps the NCAA can and should take to address the concussion
issue, as well as the issue’s potential threat to college football in its current
form if the NCAA refuses to adapt to the latest scientific discoveries about the
long-term consequences of repeated head injuries.
I. THE LINK BETWEEN FOOTBALL AND LONG-TERM HEAD INJURIES
A. The Medical Background: Concussions
The term concussion is derived from the Latin verb concutere, which
means “to shake violently.”21  The American Association of Neurological Sur-
geons (AANS) defines a concussion as “a clinical syndrome characterized by
immediate and transient alteration in brain function, including alteration of
mental status and level of consciousness, resulting from mechanical force or
trauma.”22  Although a concussion often involves a loss of consciousness, in
many situations a person may suffer a concussion without losing conscious-
ness at all.23  These so-called “mild concussions” are dangerous because they
are much more likely to go undiagnosed, yet may still result in the same
complications as much more severe concussions.  It is for this reason that
neurosurgeons often emphasize that there is really no such thing as a “minor
concussion,” as all concussions carry the potential to cause long-term
damage.24
One difficulty presented in concussion diagnosis is the wide range in
type and severity of noticeable symptoms.25  A player suffering from a concus-
sion may experience dizziness, headaches, nausea, fatigue, loss of conscious-
ness, difficulty concentrating, and memory loss.26  The symptoms may last
anywhere from a period of a few hours to months on end.27  A concussion
may only cause slight symptoms that are easily ignored by a player in the
midst of a heated contest, while a similar injury in a different player may
result in symptoms so severe that they prevent the continuation of an athletic
21 Tareg Bey & Brian Ostick, Second Impact Syndrome, 10 W.J. EMERGENCY MED. 6, 7
(2009).
22 Concussion, AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, http://www.aans.org/en/Patient%
20Information/Conditions%20and%20Treatments/Concussion.aspx (last updated Dec.
2011).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See Michael Makdissi et al., Natural History of Concussion in Sport: Markers of Severity
and Implications for Management, 38 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 464, 464–65 (2010).
26 See Terry A. Adirim, Concussions in Sports and Recreation, 8 CLINICAL PEDIATRIC EMER-
GENCY MED. 2, 3 (2007).
27 Id.
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career.28  Every concussion case is unique, and thus the injury presents a
challenge for medical professionals to properly diagnose, as well as for play-
ers to self-report their symptoms.
For decades, the long-term implications of concussions remained poorly
understood by the medical community, as it was often assumed that a concus-
sion had not occurred without a loss of consciousness and that concussions
caused no permanent damage to the brain.29  The disparity in symptoms
exhibited by players who suffered concussions made researchers skeptical of
a correlation between concussions and long-term head injuries.30  As recently
as 1994, less than a quarter of surveyed neurologists believed that post-con-
cussion syndrome could be clearly defined.31  The lack of understanding sur-
rounding the concussion issue resulted in little consensus on the best
practices of concussion management in sports until the early 2000s.
While scientists had long recognized a connection between repeated
blows to the head and long-term brain damage in boxers,32 they were slow to
recognize that athletes in other sports might also be at risk.33  In 1986, well-
28 See id. (“[T]here may be a genetic vulnerability to increased severity of brain injury
in certain individuals.”).
29 See David Orentlicher & William S. David, Concussion and Football: Failures to Respond
by the NFL and the Medical Profession, 8 FIU L. REV. 23, 26–27 (2012).
30 Id. at 28.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Harrison S. Martland, Punch Drunk, 91 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1103, 1103 (1928)
(describing “punch drunk” boxers that exhibit periods of “slight mental confusion” and
“unsteadiness” when walking). Boxers are known to develop a condition called “dementia
pugilistica” or “punch drunk syndrome.” See Gareth W. Roberts et al., The Occult Aftermath
of Boxing, 53 J. NEUROL. NEUROSURG. & PSYCHIATRY 373, 373 (1990). Athletes with punch
drunk syndrome exhibit symptoms similar to those seen in Alzheimer’s disease and Parkin-
son’s disease, including tremors, loss of mental function, dementia, and the loss of coordi-
nation and balance. Id.  Studies have demonstrated a link between the length of boxers’
careers and the development of permanent brain damage. See Ira R. Casson et al., Neuro-
logical and CT Evaluation of Knocked-Out Boxers, 45 J. NEUROL. NEUROSURG. & PSYCHIATRY
170, 174 (1982). Evidence of cerebral atrophy was most prominent in boxers who fought a
greater numbers of bouts and were known as “sluggers,” a fighting style that entails a “great
deal of battering punishment that [is] . . . received as well as given.” Id.  It is important to
note that while the objective in boxing is to knock out your opponent, the vast majority of
blows that boxers receive are “sub-concussive,” or below the threshold necessary to cause a
diagnosable concussion.  The accumulation of such sub-concussive blows over time, how-
ever, likely contributes to the development of brain damage. See Ann C. McKee et al.,
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in Athletes: Progressive Tauopathy Following Repetitive Head
Injury, 68 J. NEUROPATHOL. & EXP. NEUROL. 709, 710 (2009). Recent studies suggest that
boxers’ brains have suffered permanent damage before any symptoms even begin to mani-
fest. See Lance Pugmire, Fighters’ Brains Damaged Long Before Symptoms Emerge, Study Hints,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/19/sports/la-sp-boxing-
medical-study-20120419.  Brain cell death begins after fighting for as short a period as six
years, with more pronounced and accelerated cell death occurring after twelve years. Id.
Permanent, long-term brain damage due to repeated blows to the head is now more com-
monly termed “chronic traumatic encephalopathy.”  McKee, supra, at 710.
33 See Orentlicher & David, supra note 29, at 33.
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known neurologist Dr. Robert Cantu published a seminal set of guidelines on
concussion management in sports, which recommended specified periods of
time that athletes should be required to sit out after suffering a concussion.34
Although no longer widely accepted, the guidelines were an important early
step in developing protocols to handle head injuries.  Yet Dr. Cantu
remained ahead of his time.  His concussion guidelines were not adopted in
football at either the collegiate or professional level.  Even after the Ameri-
can Academy of Neurology released its own set of concussion guidelines in
1997,35 both the NFL and NCAA failed to adopt any sort of return-to-play
guidelines for their players.  It would take the discovery of long-term conse-
quences of great magnitude to begin to truly wake up the world of football to
the potential dangers of brain injury associated with the sport.
B. Rise of the Crisis: Discovery of Chronic Traumatic Encephalitis in Football
In 2000, Dr. Julian Bailes, a neurologist, lifelong football fan, and former
Division I college football player,36 conducted a survey of 1090 former pro-
fessional football players, asking questions about a wide variety of injuries to
avoid indicating to the participants that he was specifically interested in head
injuries.37  The results of the survey were shocking: sixty percent of players
surveyed reported they had sustained at least one concussion during their
career, and those players with concussions were experiencing neurological
problems such as memory loss, speech loss, confusion, headaches, and hear-
ing issues.38  In retrospect, Dr. Bailes believes the results of the first survey
were a revelation in magnitude similar to another groundbreaking medical
discovery of which he was a part—the HIV epidemic of the 1980s.39  While
concussions had previously been recognized as injuries that must be properly
diagnosed and managed, it was not thought that they had permanent
consequences.40
Building upon his initial work, Dr. Bailes undertook a more comprehen-
sive study, surveying 2552 former NFL players about their injuries.41  The
results furthered the link between concussions and long-term neurological
problems; players who had suffered from three or more concussions were
34 Id. at 28–29.
35 Quality Standards Subcomm., Am. Acad. of Neurology, Practice Parameter: The Man-
agement of Concussion in Sports (Summary Statement), 48 NEUROLOGY 581 (1997).
36 See MARK FAINARU-WADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL 67 (2013).
37 Id. at 68–69.
38 Id. at 69.
39 Id.
40 Id. (quoting researcher Michael Collins for the proposition that “[i]f you give the
brain time to heal, there’s no reason to see long-term deficits”); see also Michael W. Collins
et al., Relationship Between Concussion and Neuropsychological Performance in College Football
Players, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 964, 964–65 (1999) (discussing the lack of study on long-term
outcomes of athletes suffering concussions).
41 Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al., Association Between Recurrent Concussion and Late-Life Cog-
nitive Impairment in Retired Professional Football Players, 57 NEUROSURGERY 719, 721 (2005).
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five times more likely to report early signs of dementia, as well as more likely
to be diagnosed with clinical depression.42  In a third study, Bailes and his
colleagues cemented the causative link between concussions and long-term
brain damage in football players, finding that “[traumatic brain injuries] can
result in diffuse lesions in the brain . . . . These lesions result in biochemical
changes, including an increase in excitatory neurotransmitters, which has
been implicated in neuronal loss and cell death.”43  What remained was to
determine the potential extent of the brain damage that could occur as a
result of playing football.
The death at age fifty of former Pittsburgh Steelers center Mike Webster
and the subsequent postmortem diagnosis of Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy (CTE) in his brain launched the issue of concussions in
football into the spotlight.44  CTE is a disorder that was first recognized in
the sport of boxing.45  It is characterized by atrophy of the brain cells due to
the development of extensive, condensed tau-protein tangles in regions of
the brain, which occurs as the result of repeated traumatic brain injury.46
The disease first manifests itself through symptoms such as diminished atten-
tion span, concentration, and memory, as well as dizziness and headaches.47
As the disease progresses, lack of coordination, psychotic symptoms, depres-
sion, and overt dementia often become apparent.48  Webster, once a Hall of
Fame player for the Pittsburgh Steelers,49 was homeless and suffering from
severe dementia and paranoia at the time of his death.50
Since the discovery of CTE in Webster’s brain, other former NFL players
have been diagnosed with the disease.  Dr. Bennet Omalu, who studied Web-
ster, also found CTE in the brains of former players Andre Waters and Terry
Long.  Both players tragically committed suicide; Waters shot himself, and
Long consumed a bottle of antifreeze.51  Former Chicago Bears safety Dave
Duerson requested that his brain be donated to science because he believed
42 Id. at 721.
43 Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al., Recurrent Concussion and Risk of Depression in Retired Profes-
sional Football Players, 39 MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE 903, 907 (2007).
44 See Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football
League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 128, 129 (2005).
45 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
46 See McKee et al., supra note 32, at 709.  It is important to note that “traumatic brain
injury” includes a concussion, but may also result from repeated sub-concussive blows to
the head. Id. at 710.  While CTE has been proven to result from multiple traumatic brain
injuries, it remains unclear if the syndrome can develop as the result of a single brain
injury.
47 Id. at 710.
48 Id. at 710–11.
49 Mike Webster, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/
member.aspx?PLAYER_ID=227 (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
50 See FAINARU-WADA & FAINARU, supra note 36, at 47–62.
51 See Document Says Former Steeler Drank Antifreeze in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at
D4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/27/sports/football/27nfl.html?page
wanted=print; Tom Farrey, Pathologist Says Waters’ Brain Tissue Had Deteriorated, ESPN.COM
(updated Jan. 19, 2007, 6:24 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2734941
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he was afflicted with CTE, which was confirmed after Duerson ended his own
life by shooting himself in the chest.52  In 2012, former San Diego Chargers
linebacker Junior Seau committed suicide and his autopsy also revealed
CTE.53  While CTE cannot be conclusively determined as the direct cause of
a person’s choice to take his own life,54 the symptoms of depression, mental
instability, and psychosis associated with the disease are all major risk factors
for suicide.55  The growing trend of suicides amongst former players afflicted
with CTE demonstrates the most devastating effects of the disease.
Recent research has revealed former players suffering from CTE who
never played professionally—indicating that the disease may begin to
develop from head injuries sustained at the youth, high school, and college
levels.56  The first of such diagnosis was Chris Borich, a former wide receiver
at Western Illinois University, who died of a drug overdose at age forty-two in
a severe bout of depression.57  Dr. Ann McKee—the co-director of Boston
University’s Center for the Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy, where
Borich’s brain was diagnosed—stated, “I’ve looked at more than 1,000 brains,
and I’ve never seen this in any individual living a normal life—its only
through head trauma.”58  The recent CTE-related deaths of several former
college football players59 further indicate that the disease is not limited to
(noting that “the condition of Waters’ brain tissue was what would be expected in an 85-
year old man”).
52 See Julie Deardorff, Duerson’s Brain was Damaged, Study Shows, CHI. TRIB. (May 2,
2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-05-02/sports/ct-spt-0503-duerson-brain—
20110502_1_study-of-traumatic-encephalopathy-duerson-family-brain-bank.
53 See Mary Pilon & Ken Belson, Seau Had Brain Disease Found in Other Ex-Players, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013, at B13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/sports/
football/junior-seau-suffered-from-brain-disease.html.
54 See Mike Fish, Rushing to Find a Connection, ESPN.COM (updated Nov. 27, 2012, 2:34
PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/page/Football%20at%20Crossroads2/when-
former-football-players-commit-suicide-some-see-connection-brain-injuries-suffered-play
ing-days-experts-urge-caution.
55 See Risk Factors and Warning Signs, AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION, http://www
.afsp.org/preventing-suicide/risk-factors-and-warning-signs (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
56 See Ann C. McKee et al., The Spectrum of Disease in Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy,
136 BRAIN 43, 48 (2013) (diagnosing nine former college football players with CTE).
57 See Alan Schwarz, Case Suggests Safety Risk Goes Beyond the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2009, at B14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/sports/ncaafootball/22
concussions.html?_r=0.
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., Caleb Daniloff, CTE Found in Dead College Football Player, BU TODAY (Sept.
14, 2010), http://www.bu.edu/today/2010/cte-found-in-dead-college-football-player/ (dis-
cussing autopsy findings that suggest former college football player Owen Thomas suffered
from CTE); David Steele, Cullen Finnerty’s Cause of Death Revealed, SPORTING NEWS (updated
Aug. 8, 2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/story/2013-08-08/
cullen-finnerty-cause-of-death-oxycodone-pneumonia-quarterback (noting CTE as a con-
tributing factor in former college quarterback Cullen Finnerty’s death).  The case of Owen
Thomas was particularly unique, in that he was the first diagnosed case of CTE who was an
active player at the time of his death.  Daniloff, supra.  Also, Thomas was never diagnosed
with a concussion during his playing career, adding to the speculation among scientists
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only those who have long professional careers.  All of these tragic cases high-
light the need for a comprehensive system of regulation to address the issue
of head injuries in football.
II. RECOGNIZING THE PROBLEM: HOW THE REGULATION OF CONCUSSIONS IN
COLLEGE FOOTBALL HAS FALLEN BEHIND THE GAME
AT OTHER LEVELS
Over the past few years there has been a dramatic increase in national
attention given to the issue of concussions in football.  Many public figures,
perhaps most notably President Barack Obama,60 but also many former pro-
fessional football players, have questioned whether they would let their chil-
dren play the sport.61  The concern over the consequences of long-term head
injuries has prompted legislators, medical professionals, and recently the
NFL to take steps to address the issue.  While the NCAA made some limited
changes to its concussion policy in 2010, its attempts remain insufficient to
address the scope of the problem.
A. Legislation to Address Concussions in Youth Football: “Lystedt Laws”
In 2006, thirteen-year old Zackery Lystedt, a star player on his junior
high football team, suffered a concussion while making a tackle just before
halftime.62  Lystedt returned to play in the second half despite the injury and
later collapsed on the field.63  He was rushed to a local hospital where doc-
tors had to perform emergency surgery to relieve the swelling in his brain.64
Although Lystedt survived, he suffered permanent brain damage.65  The
Washington state legislature recognized that Lystedt’s case was symbolic of a
bigger issue and subsequently passed the “Lystedt Law,” which prevents any
youth football player who is diagnosed with a concussion or shows concussive
symptoms from returning to a game or practice until he has been cleared by
that CTE can develop as the result of repeated sub-concussive hits. Id.  It must be empha-
sized, however, that while CTE may be a contributing factor in a suicide, it cannot be
conclusively linked as the direct cause.
60 See Cindy Boren, Obama Uncertain if He’d Let a Son Play Football, WASH. POST (Jan. 28,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-lead/wp/2013/01/28/obama-uncer-
tain-if-hed-let-a-son-play-football (quoting President Obama as stating “I’m a big football
fan, but I have to tell you, if I had a son, I’d have to think long and hard before I let him
play football”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 See Bob Cook, If Kurt Warner’s Not So Sure His Kids Should Play Football, Should Your
Kids Be Playing?, FORBES (May 7, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2012/05/
07/if-kurt-warners-not-so-sure-his-kids-should-play-football-should-your-kids-be-playing/
(discussing how the former Pro Bowl quarterback stated in a radio interview he would
prefer if his kids did not play football).
62 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, THE LYSTEDT LAW: A CONCUSSION
SURVIVOR’S JOURNEY, http://www.cdc.gov/media/subtopic/matte/pdf/031210-Zack-story
.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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a licensed medical professional.66  Further, the law requires that school dis-
tricts work with coaches, teachers, and trainers in order to promote educa-
tion about concussions among student-athletes.67
Since the passage of Washington’s Lystedt Law, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia have passed similar legislation to address concussions in
youth football.68  All of these states have taken an approach similar to Wash-
ington, requiring players who suffer a concussion to sit out until they receive
clearance from a medical professional, and mandating concussion education
for youth athletes.69  The education component is particularly important, as
one of the biggest problems with diagnosing the injury may be the tendency
of players to hide their symptoms in order to remain in the game.  In a
recent survey of high school football players, more than fifty percent of
respondents said that they would ignore symptoms such as a headache in
order to stay in a game.70  Thus it is essential that coaches and trainers con-
tinue to increase student-athlete awareness about the consequences of sus-
taining multiple concussions, especially where the first injury has yet to heal.
While not a complete solution, state legislation represents a critical step to
addressing the problem in youth football by establishing firm requirements
for return to play, and by promoting a better understanding of the severity of
concussive injuries.
B. The National Football League
Concussions have been a divisive topic in the world of professional foot-
ball.  The NFL has faced sharp criticism for its policies regarding head inju-
ries, with some commentators going as far as accusing the league of
conducting a “war”71 against the science linking concussions to long-term
brain damage.  Although the league may not have been at the forefront in
addressing the issue, over the past few years genuine change has been imple-
mented in league policy to reduce the risks of concussions for players.  The
first major step was the creation of a strict return-to-play policy, which
removes players from play even if they are only experiencing relatively minor
symptoms and requires that the player be fully asymptomatic before
66 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.190 (West 2013).
67 Id.
68 See Joe Frollo Sun, See Where Your State Stands on Concussion Law, USA FOOTBALL
(May 21, 2013), http://usafootball.com/news/featured-articles/see-where-your-state-
stands-concussion-law.
69 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.9155 (West 2013) (providing for the adop-
tion of Michigan’s Concussion Awareness and Training Program); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
271.5 (West 2013) (providing for the adoption of a student-athlete concussion policy).
70 Carla Kemp, High School Athletes Say Concussions Won’t Sideline Them, AAP NEWS, (May
6, 2013), http://aapnews.aappublications.org/content/early/2013/05/06/aapnews.2013
0506-2.full.pdf+httml.
71 See FAINARU-WADA & FAINARU, supra note 36, at 2.
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returning.72  In 2011, the league updated its testing policy, requiring every
player to undergo a baseline evaluation during the preseason that is then
compared with the results of concussion tests conducted on the sideline dur-
ing games.73  The new sideline test is comprehensive and provides team med-
ical staff with a clear, consistent manner of examining players for concussion
symptoms.
Despite these policy changes, critics challenged that team doctors lack
the objectivity necessary to properly protect the safety interests of players.74
The NFL responded in the 2013 season by hiring independent neurologists
to work each sideline, whose sole responsibility is to watch for symptoms of,
and diagnose players with, head injuries.75  Further, changes to the rules of
the game have sought to specifically reduce blows to the head, including pen-
alties for leading with the helmet and targeting the head of an opposing
player.76  Players now face strict discipline, including monetary fines and
game suspensions for hits to the head.77  NFL players have recognized, albeit
in some cases reluctantly, that certain aspects of the game must change in
order to improve safety.78
The NFL’s current concussion policy is far from perfect, but it repre-
sents an effort on the part of the league to address the issue by altering both
the way the game is played and how injuries are handled.  Additionally, the
league is supporting the effort to address head injuries throughout the sport,
providing funding for concussion research as well as developing youth pro-
grams to teach proper tackling techniques.79  In comparison to the NCAA,
72 See Press Release, National Football League, NFL Adopts Stricter Statement on
Return-to-Play Following Concussions (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.nflevolution
.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/nfl_adopts_stricter_statement_on_return-
to-play_following_concussions-508.pdf.
73 See Standardized Concussion Tests Coming to the NFL, NFL.COM (updated July 26, 2012,
8:47 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81e76bed/article/standardized-con
cussion-tests-coming-to-the-nfl. 
74 See, e.g., Daniel S. Goldberg, Concussions, Professional Sports, and Conflicts of Interest:
Why the National Football League’s Current Policies are Bad for Its (Players’) Health, 20 HEC
FORUM 337, 351 (2008) (arguing that “structural conflicts of interest that affect NFL policy”
must be removed to properly care for its players).
75 See Bill Bradley, Independent Concussion Specialists Ready to Work NFL Sidelines, NFL
.COM (updated Sept. 3, 2013, 4:49 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap10000002377
39/article/independent-concussion-specialists-ready-to-work-nfl-sidelines.
76 N.F.L. RULES, Rule 12, § 1, art. 9(c).
77 See Hits to Head Still Prevalent in NFL, ESPN.COM (updated Dec. 10, 2013, 8:14 PM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/10115901/study-hits-head-prevalent-nfl (noting that
the NFL “makes a big splash out of suspensions and fines levied under the umbrella of
protecting players”).
78 Id. (“Defensive players acknowledged they have to do their part to make the game
safer.”).
79 See Rick Maese, Tackling a Crisis, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.washing
tonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/2013/10/24/tackling-a-crisis/ (describing the NFL’s new part-
nership with USA Football, in which 90,000 youth coaches have signed up for “Heads Up”
football, a program to promote the teaching of proper tackling fundamentals).
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the NFL has moved to respond to the concussion crisis with vigor, which may
be due in part to the disproportionate share of criticism that has fallen upon
the league, particularly the pressure of congressional hearings.80  The NFL’s
improvements to its concussion policies offer a framework for the NCAA to
follow in implementing a detailed, comprehensive approach to treating
concussions.
C. The NCAA’s Current Approach Fails to Protect Player Safety
In 1905, over eighteen collegiate football players died on the field, and
more than one hundred others sustained debilitating injuries.81  University
administrators debated whether football could in fact be regulated or if the
sport would need to be outlawed altogether.82  President Theodore
Roosevelt convened a conference of major college administrators at the
White House, where an effort to reform football in order to improve player
safety gave birth to the NCAA.83  The NCAA’s website notes that the express
purpose behind the association’s founding was to “protect young people
from the dangerous and exploitive athletics practices of the time.”84  As the
association has developed over the past century, it has continued to promote
the protection of college football players, through the implementation of
rule changes, eligibility restrictions, and the evolution of required protective
equipment.
The NCAA contends that part of its core mission is “to provide student-
athletes with a competitive environment that is safe and ensures fair play.”85
However the very next line contains an important caveat: “While each school
is responsible for the welfare of its student-athletes, the NCAA provides lead-
ership by establishing safety guidelines, playing rules, . . . and research into
the cause of injuries to assist decision making.”86  Thus a regulatory body that
was established for the very purpose of protecting the safety of football players,
and whose claimed mission is to promote safe play, refuses to do more than
provide guidelines for its member institutions to follow.
Under the NCAA’s current concussion policy, member schools are
responsible for implementing their own concussion management plans,
80 See Rodney K. Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem and Saving Professional Football, 35
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 127, 172–74 (2013) (describing how Congress’s harsh criticisms of the
NFL’s handling of concussions during congressional hearings helped spur change on the
issue).
81 Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in
Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12 (2000) (detailing the early
history of the NCAA).
82 Id. at 11.
83 Id. at 12.
84 Health And Safety, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (last visited Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety.
85 Sports Injuries, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (last visited Apr. 8, 2014), http://
www.ncaastudent.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Health+and+Safety/Sports+Injur
ies/.
86 Id.
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which only need to meet the NCAA’s basic requirements.87  This approach
fails to recognize that player safety is often compromised when left to regula-
tion by individual educational institutions.88  Particularly in NCAA Division I,
where the success of the football program often helps drive alumni support89
and boosts enrollment,90 the pressure to win is enormous.  Undoubtedly
there are schools that have up-to-date concussion management plans that are
consistently implemented.  Yet without a central, enforceable mandate from
the NCAA, there will still be institutions that fail to protect the safety of their
players, especially where some concussion protocols may create a competitive
disadvantage.91  Coaches cannot be relied upon to effectively police head
injuries amongst their own players, as they have a strong incentive to ensure
they field the best team possible every week—their livelihoods depend upon
it.92
Team physicians and athletic trainers, who hold the primary responsibil-
ity for diagnosing and managing head injuries, are typically university
employees or paid contractors, which creates a direct conflict of interest
between their duty to their patients and their duty to their employer.  Doc-
tors and trainers may operate under tremendous pressure to clear a player to
play despite reservations about his health, particularly when dealing with a
star athlete crucial to the team’s success.93  The physician’s duty is to deter-
mine what is in the best interest of the athlete.  However, the objectivity nec-
87 See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 19, at § 3.2.4.17.
88 See, e.g., supra notes 1–20 and accompanying text.
89 See Malcolm Getz & John Siegfried, What Does Intercollegiate Athletics Do To or For
Colleges and Universities? 8 (Vand. Univ., Working Paper No. 10-W05, 2010), available at
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu10-w05.pdf.
90 See Sean Silverthorne, The Flutie Effect: How Athletic Success Boosts College Applications,
FORBES (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2013/04/
29/the-flutie-effect-how-athletic-success-boosts-college-applications/.
91 For example, an institution with strict return-to-play guidelines that require a player
to be asymptomatic before returning, such as those now used in the NFL, will likely be
forced to hold players out of games for longer than other institutions with more relaxed
rules.
92 See Mark Schlabach, Hot Seat Temp Rises for Coaches, ESPN.COM (Aug. 15, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/preview12/story/_/id/8268623/college-football-
expectations-win-now-coaches-hot-seat (describing the constant pressure on college foot-
ball coaches to win and win immediately; their job performance is determined by wins and
losses).
93 See, e.g., Craig A. Isaacs, Comment, Conflicts of Interest for Team Physicians: A Retrospec-
tive in Light of Gathers v. Loyola Marymount University, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 147, 148–49
(1992) (discussing the case of Hank Gathers, a star basketball player at Loyola Marymount
University who collapsed on the court and died during a game, after the team physician
was pressured to lower the dosage of Gathers’s heart medication because the team coach
felt it was limiting his play); Kevin B. O’Reilly, Put Me in, Doc: When Doctors Must Say No to
Athletes, AM. MED. NEWS (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.amednews.com/article/20101018/
profession/310189942/4/ (describing the pressures placed on team physicians by coach-
ing staffs).  Texas Christian University’s football team doctor Samuel J. Haraldson reported
being screamed at by head coach Gary Patterson after holding star running back Ed Wesley
out of the game when he showed signs of a concussion. Id.  The altercation between Har-
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essary to render a proper medical decision is lost when the interests of the
university employing the doctor are at odds with that of the player.
Team doctors and trainers are inherently interested actors—such posi-
tions, particularly at big-time college football programs, are prestigious, often
lucrative, and highly sought after within the sports medicine community.94
This may result in trainers being pressured to bow to the demands of the
team at the expense of players in the interest of maintaining their employ-
ment with the school.  In the case of concussions, where the symptoms can be
difficult to diagnose and may be easy for athletes to attempt to “play
through,” there is an even greater need for an objective, independent deci-
sion maker to determine if the athlete may return to play.
The relationship between the team doctor and players is further compli-
cated by the athlete’s interest in returning to play.  College football players
are never more than a single major injury away from losing their scholarship
if coaches or athletic directors determine that the player has become expend-
able.95  The pressure to play through injury is enormous—scholarships and
starting positions are on the line.  Further, the lure of multi-million dollar
salaries at the professional level creates a strong incentive for players to play
through injury in order to avoid hurting their stock in the NFL draft or earn-
ing the label of being “injury prone.”96  Both of these factors may drive stu-
dent-athletes to work against team doctors, as well as against their own best
interests, by ignoring or playing through head injuries.
Football has long been characterized by a “warrior culture.”97  Players
are taught from a young age that there is a difference between “being hurt”
and “being injured.”  The team-oriented culture of the game pressures play-
aldson and Patterson was captured on national television, but no action was taken to disci-
pline the coach for his conduct. Id.
94 See Barry R. Furrow, The Problem of the Sports Doctor: Serving Two (or is it Three or Four?)
Masters, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 165, 171 (2005) (“The sports doctor, often an intense sports
fan, gets employment with teams and direct involvement in the sport.  And if the physician
is part of a medical group, the group gets tremendously valuable free advertising that will
draw in other patients.”).
95 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 19, at § 15.3.3.1(e).  The NCAA’s
requirements allow schools to grant scholarships between one and five years in length. Id.;
see also Meghan Walsh, ‘I Trusted ‘Em’: When NCAA Schools Abandon Their Injured Athletes, THE
ATLANTIC (May 1, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/05/i-
trusted-em-when-ncaa-schools-abandon-their-injured-athletes/275407/ (“There is also no
provision in the Division I Manual to prohibit a coach from revoking a scholarship the year
after a recruit gets hurt.”).
96 See Paul Kuharsky, Locker Doesn’t Combat Injury-Prone Talk, ESPN.COM (Nov. 18, 2013,
9:43 AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/101581/locker-doesnt-combat-
injury-prone-talk (discussing how NFL quarterback Jake Locker has earned a negative label
as “injury prone” after suffering three injuries in two seasons).
97 See LINDA CARROLL & DAVID ROSNER, THE CONCUSSION CRISIS 35 (2011) (“Americans
liked their sports, especially football, the way they were . . . . The macho culture permeat-
ing the country insisted that the way to deal with a bump on the head was just to dust
yourself off and keep going as if nothing had happened.”); Ken Belson, Goodell Speaks of
Changes Needed in N.F.L. Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at B13 (“[A] cultural shift [is]
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ers to continue despite their injuries for fear of letting down their team-
mates.98  Unless an independent authority exists to force players to sit out
when they have suffered head injuries, athletes will continue to play through
them.
In other arenas, particularly demarcating the line of “amateurism” in
college sports, the NCAA has not shied away from aggressively regulating,
investigating, and policing its member institutions.99  If the NCAA is capable
and willing to enforce its myriad system of rules regarding eligibility and
recruiting, it is surely able to do a better job in addressing the issue of head
injuries.  Particularly at a time when many critics are beginning to question
whether the NCAA should be so rigorously focused on enforcing amateurism
in college athletics,100 it appears facially hypocritical that the association
would devote so little attention to an issue as paramount to its mission as
player safety.  The NCAA continues to ignore the calls of the medical profes-
sion, players, fans, and even administrators of its own member institutions, to
needed to change the ‘warrior mentality’ of players unwilling to disclose when they are
hurt.”).
98 See Jan Hoffman, ‘Don’t Tell Coach’: Playing Through Concussions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5,
2013, 12:01 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/dont-tell-coach-playing-
through-concussions/?ref=headinjuries&gwh=ADECE1B85CBEA74C16BEB96318EF42D4
&_r=0.  Former college football player Chris Coyne recalled playing through multiple con-
cussions and admitted that he would regularly avoid athletic trainers and hide symptoms
from his coach. Id.  “I put pressure on myself to do well and not to let my teammates
down.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Seglin, Should Colleges Pay Athletes to Play?, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 20,
2013), http://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/sns-201306251100—tms—rite
thngctnrt-a20130625-20130625,0,4945501.story.  NCAA President Mark Emmert on “Pay
for Play”: “As long as I’m president of the NCAA, we will not pay student athletes to play
sports.  Compensation for students is just something I’m adamantly opposed to.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In October 2012, the NCAA implemented drastic
changes to its enforcement scheme, including imposing a four-tiered system of violations
and subsequent penalties to punish NCAA rules infractions. JEFF BENEDICT & ARMEN
KETEYIAN, THE SYSTEM 198 (2013).  Further, the NCAA has increased the size of its enforce-
ment staff by fifty percent since 2010, now employing fifty-nine investigators as of spring
2013. Id. at 199.  The majority of these enforcement personnel have law degrees, with
backgrounds in civil and criminal litigation. Id. at 199–200.  The central focus of this
renewed emphasis on enforcement is to firmly send the message that “cheaters will not
profit,” by punishing eligibility and recruiting rules violators. Id. at 201–14 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
100 See, e.g., Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 7, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/
308643/.  “[T]he real scandal is not that students are getting illegally paid or recruited, it’s
that two of the noble principles on which the NCAA justifies its existence—‘amateurism’
and the ‘student-athlete’—are cynical hoaxes, legalistic confections propagated by universi-
ties . . . [to] exploit the skills and fame of young athletes.” Id.
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take stronger leadership on head injuries in football and improve its policies
to meet the current best practices on concussion management.101
If the NCAA continues to refuse to address the concussion issue, Con-
gress has begun to evince willingness to force the association’s hand legisla-
tively.  A bill titled the “Collegiate Student Athlete Protection Act”102 was
recently introduced into the House of Representatives.103  The Act would
require mandatory baseline concussion testing for all athletes, as well as pre-
vent schools from revoking the scholarships of injured players.104  The Act
would be limited in its effect to schools whose athletic departments generate
at least $10 million in media rights fees annually, which would include most
schools in major athletic conferences at the Division I level.105  Although it
remains unclear whether such legislation will gather enough support to be
passed in the near future, the fact that Congress is debating such a bill fur-
ther symbolizes that the NCAA has failed to adequately address concussions
in college football.
III. THE NCAA’S LEGAL LIABILITY FOR LONG-TERM HEAD INJURIES
In September 2011, former Eastern Illinois football player Adrian
Arrington filed a class action complaint in federal court against the NCAA,
alleging that the association acted negligently with regard to its policies on
concussions, and that, as a result, a class of former college athletes has suf-
fered permanent brain injuries.106  Although individual schools have previ-
ously been sued on numerous occasions for their handling of head
injuries,107 Arrington was the first plaintiff to name the NCAA as a defen-
dant.  Several other plaintiffs subsequently filed similar suits against the asso-
ciation, which were consolidated into a single class action.108  While the
101 For the most recent statement on the best practices of concussion management, see
generally Paul McCrory et al., Consensus Statement on Concussion in Sport: The 4th Interna-
tional Conference on Concussion in Sport, 48 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 554 (2013).
102 H.R. 3545, 113th Cong. (2013).
103 See Steve Berkowitz, Proposal Aims to Protect Athletes at the Wealthiest Schools, USA
TODAY (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/11/20/
ncaa-collegiate-student-athlete-protection-act-tony-cardenas/3649699/.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 87–90, Arrington v. NCAA, No. 11-
CV-06356 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2013).
107 See, e.g., Complaint at 1–25, Silk v. Bowling Green State Univ., No. 2012-06521 (Ct.
Claim. Ohio Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://cases.ohiocourtofclaims.gov/cgi-bin/
wspd_cgi.sh/streamfile.p?Serial=120829001300987&Seq=1 (suing the university, head foot-
ball coach, head athletic trainer, and others for negligence and other claims after a series
of concussions); Alan Schwarz, La Salle Will Pay Ex-Player $7.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2009, at B14 (describing La Salle University’s settlement with a football player who sus-
tained brain damage as a result of head injuries).
108 See Rachel Axon, NCAA Concussion Lawsuits Consolidated, USA TODAY (Jan. 2, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/01/02/concussion-lawsuits-ncaa-
consolidated-adrian-arrington/4293867/; Fenno, supra note 4.
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NCAA continues to deny liability for the plaintiffs’ injuries, it likely recog-
nizes the reputational damage that may accompany a long and protracted
fight in court.  As of this writing, the NCAA is attempting to negotiate a settle-
ment agreement with the plaintiffs.109
A. Does the NCAA Have a Duty to Protect Its Student-Athletes
from Head Injuries?
The plaintiff class in Arrington contends that the NCAA, operating as the
regulatory body for college athletics, has a duty toward the plaintiff class “to
supervise, regulate, monitor and provide reasonable and appropriate rules to
minimize the risk of injury to the players.”110  Under the doctrine of negli-
gence, the general rule imposes no affirmative duty to act: “The fact that the
actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for
another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take
such action.”111  The NCAA insists that it is solely the duty of its member
institutions to protect player safety.  As NCAA Director of Health & Safety
David Klossner stated, “Our membership is in charge of educating student-
athletes and providing medical care autonomously.”112  The question of
whether the NCAA actually has a duty to provide any protection to its stu-
dent-athletes against concussions is thus central to whether any legal liability
may be imposed on the association for its failure to act.
1. A Special Relationship Exists Between the NCAA and Student-Athletes
An exception to the general rule of an actor having no affirmative duty
to act exists where a special relationship between an actor and another party
“[i]mpose[s] upon the actor the duty to take affirmative precautions for the
aid or protection of the other.”113  This “special relationship” exception
applies only where a “relation exists between the parties, and the risk of
harm . . . arises in the course of that relation.”114  Although The Restatement
lists specific categories of special relationships that are presumed to consti-
tute exceptions to the general rule, it is also notes that “[t]he law appears . . .
to be working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any
relation of dependence.”115
109 See Jon Solomon, NCAA Agrees to Settlement Talks Over Concussions with 2nd Set of Ex-
Players, AL.COM (updated Oct. 21, 2013, 11:17 PM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/
2013/10/ncaa_agrees_to_mediation_with.html.
110 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 106, at 87.
111 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
112 See Schwarz, supra note 107, at B14.
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. a (1965).
114 Id. § 314A cmt. c.
115 Id. § 314A cmt. b.
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Over time, courts have gradually expanded the scope of the “special rela-
tionship” exception to the no-duty rule.116  It has generally been recognized
that “legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory
expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for
damage done.”117  In his treatise on torts, Professor Dobbs lists numerous
factors that courts generally consider in determining whether a duty exists,
such as the relationship between the parties, whether the harm was reasona-
bly foreseeable to the defendant, the defendant’s moral blame for the harm,
and the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and
the harm caused.118
Given the information available to the NCAA, it appears likely that a
court would find it “reasonably foreseeable” that players might suffer long-
term health consequences if head injuries are handled improperly.  The
NCAA has been collecting concussion injury rates in college football since
1986.119  In addition, it has been aware of the dangers of sustaining multiple
concussions since at least 2003.120  Because the NCAA is the supreme regula-
tory body in college athletics and possesses the most comprehensive injury
data and latest scientific information, it was certainly reasonably foreseeable
that players might suffer long-term injuries if the NCAA failed to take reason-
able steps to address the handling of concussions.
The relationship between the NCAA and its student-athletes also sup-
ports the recognition of a legal duty of care to protect athlete health and
safety.  In carrying out its mission of preserving amateurism,121 the NCAA
assumes a vast degree of control over its student-athletes.  It has the authority
to legislate rules governing conduct, academic standards, and the ability of
athletes to profit from their own brand and likeness.  While the student-ath-
lete is strictly prevented from receiving any type of financial gain for partici-
pation in college athletics, the NCAA and its member institutions profit
immensely from college football.122
The student-athlete submits himself to this relationship in exchange for
the perceived benefits of development as a student-athlete, a subsidized col-
lege education, and preparation for future success in society.  As part of sub-
116 See John M. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About
the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV.
867, 896–98.
117 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).
118 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 229 (2000).
119 See Report of Robert C. Cantu, supra note 20, at 14.
120 See Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al., Cumulative Effects Associated with Recurrent Concussion
in Collegiate Football Players, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2549, 2552 (2003) (finding that football
players who have previously suffered a concussion are three times more likely to suffer
another concussion and noting the implications of these findings for return-to-play guide-
lines). The NCAA partially funded the Guskiewicz study. Id. at 2554.
121 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
122 See BENEDICT & KETEYIAN, supra note 99, at 197.  The NCAA was expected to gener-
ate $800 million in revenue in 2012, ninety-five percent of which comes from media rights
payments. Id.
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mitting to the authority of the NCAA, student-athletes place substantial
confidence in the association to exercise its power to promote their well-
being123 and best interests.  Thus the NCAA enters into a special relationship
with its student-athletes—student-athletes place trust and confidence in the
NCAA as the governing body of collegiate sports to promote their best inter-
ests as amateur athletes, while simultaneously giving the NCAA vast control to
regulate their conduct.
The relationship between the NCAA and its student-athletes also places
students in a position of inferior bargaining power.  Those students who
choose to participate in college athletics have almost no power to alter the
level of control that the NCAA may exert over them—by accepting a scholar-
ship they agree to be subject to the association’s numerous rules and regula-
tions.  Since the NFL places an age restriction on draft eligibility124 and no
viable minor league system exists, high school football players with aspira-
tions of playing professionally have no real options besides playing college
football.125  Further, student-athletes are adolescents growing into adult-
hood.  Although college students are generally considered adults, courts
have consistently recognized that students still have a reasonable expectation
that colleges will provide them protection from foreseeable harm.126  It is
only reasonable that college athletes have a similar expectation toward the
NCAA.  Unlike professional players, who have the protections of a powerful
players’ union and collective bargaining rights, college football players
depend upon the NCAA to protect their best interests.
The NCAA justifies its continued preservation of the system of amateur-
ism on the basis that student-athletes need protection from “exploitation by
commercial and professional enterprises.”127  Thus the relationship into
which the NCAA enters with its student-athletes is based on central principles
123 See Office of the President: On the Mark, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www
.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/office-president/office-president-mark (last visited Apr. 9,
2014).  NCAA President Mark Emmert states that one of the “priorities” of the association
is “student-athlete well-being.” Id. (internal quotation marks omittered).
124 NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, ELIGIBILITY RULES (n.d.), available at https://www.nflre-
gionalcombines.com/Docs/Eligibility%20rules.pdf.
125 See Gerry DiNardo, Why Not Let 18-Year-Olds Head Straight for the Pros?, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2011, at SP15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/sports/ncaafoot
ball/why-not-let-18-year-olds-head-straight-for-the-pros.html?_r=0.  A former college foot-
ball coach, DiNardo argues that aspiring professional players ought to have options besides
college football. Id.  “Maybe we are not listening to the players who are saying, ‘I really
don’t want to be in college, but what alternative do I have if I want to play professional
football?’” Id.; see also Tim Keown, Injustice of NFL Draft Restriction, ESPN.COM (updated
Feb. 13, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/draft2013/story/_/id/8943142/draft-re
striction-makes-sense-colleges-nfl-not-players (“What will the players do?  They will go back
to school.  They have no choice.”).
126 Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Mass. 1983) (“Parents, students,
and the general community still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges
themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect resident students from fore-
seeable harm.”).
127 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 19, at § 2.15.
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of protection and dependence; the NCAA agrees to protect the best interests
of student-athletes and foster their development, while student-athletes agree
to forgo certain rights (e.g., the ability to profit in any manner on their
endeavors as an athlete) in order to preserve the character and quality of the
overall product128—the amateur student-athlete ideal.  In entering this rela-
tionship, the NCAA has assumed the duty to provide reasonable protection
for the well-being of student-athletes.  The scope of this duty implicitly
includes physical well-being—as the protection of student-athletes’ financial
and educational well-being would be rendered meaningless if their physical
well-being is allowed to suffer in the process.
2. Undertaking of a Duty to Provide Reasonable Care
Another exception to the general rule of an actor having no affirmative
duty to act provides that “[o]ne who undertakes . . . to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care . . . .”129  Liability will
only be imposed if the failure to exercise care either increases the risk of
harm or if the harm is suffered because of the other party’s reliance on the
undertaking.130  An undertaking may include express promises as well as
actions that imply an intention or commitment to act.131
The NCAA was founded on the principle of protecting player safety.132
Due to the inability of individual universities to effectively regulate safety in
the game of football, administrators came together to create a regulatory
body that could govern the sport as a whole.  On its website, the NCAA states,
“student-athlete health, safety and well-being remain among our top priori-
ties.”133  Since its founding, the NCAA has consistently exercised its power to
protect student-athlete safety134—from mandating that football players wear
128 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (noting that
“the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—college football”).  “The identi-
fication of this ‘product’ with an academic tradition differentiates college football from
and makes it more popular than professional sports . . . .  [T]o preserve the character and
quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and
the like.” Id. at 101–02.
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
130 Id.
131 See Florence v. Goldberg, 375 N.E.2d 763, 767 (N.Y. 1978) (recognizing an under-
taking and subsequent reliance where police consistently provided crossing guards, upon
whom parents relied in assisting children to cross the street).
132 See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.
133 Health and Safety, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/health-
and-safety (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
134 See Rachel Axon, Does NCAA Face More Concussion Liability than NFL?, USA TODAY
(July 25, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/07/25/ncaa-concus-
sion-lawsuit-adrian-arrington/2588189/.  In a statement in response to the filing of the
Arrington lawsuit, NCAA spokeswoman Stacey Osburn indicated the association’s commit-
ment to player safety: “The NCAA has been at the forefront of safety issues throughout its
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helmets,135 to requiring that schools have a concussion management plan on
file,136 to the most recent change, a new rule specifically created to prevent
head injuries, which allows referees to eject a player from a game for a
targeted hit to the head of an opponent.137  The NCAA has thus made an
explicit commitment to fostering player health and safety and affirmed this
commitment through its actions.
Based on its inception as a regulatory body to promote safety in col-
legiate athletics, as well as the consistent historical application of its regula-
tory power over member institutions to protect student-athletes’ health, the
NCAA has undertaken a duty to provide reasonable protections for its stu-
dent-athletes against injury.  Although the NCAA seeks to pass off this duty to
its member schools, the very purpose of the NCAA’s founding was to address
safety issues in sports that individual universities were incapable of handling
themselves.  Student-athletes place reliance upon the NCAA’s superior
knowledge and position of authority to provide them reasonable protection
from long-term injury.  The NCAA has explicitly acknowledged this reliance,
stating in its sports medicine handbook, “ ‘[S]tudent-athletes rightfully
assume that those who sponsor intercollegiate athletics have taken reasona-
ble precaution to minimize the risks of injury from athletics.’”138  In under-
taking to regulate safety in college football, the NCAA assumed a legal duty
to provide reasonable protections to college football players against long-
term head injuries.
B. Did the NCAA Violate Its Duty of Care?
Where a legal obligation to act is imposed, the defendant is not required
to provide complete or perfect care, but rather is held to a standard of rea-
sonable care under the circumstances.139  However, in situations involving
sports, a defendant’s duty of care may be qualified even further, as it is recog-
nized that a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks inher-
ent in the nature of a sport.140  While suffering a head injury in the course of
playing football is certainly a danger inherent to the sport, the negligent
treatment and management of such injuries, leading to further or long-term
damage, is beyond the scope of inherent risk assumed by players.  Courts
have recognized a failure to supervise a high school football player’s injury as
beyond the scope of inherent risk and imposed the normal duty of reasona-
existence . . . .  [W]e continue to believe our policies and rules address student-athlete
safety.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
135 See Jeff Miller, The College Football Helmet Has Come a Long Way, ALL STUDENT ATH-
LETES (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.allstudentathletes.com/Blogs/CollegeFootballHelmet.
136 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 19, at § 3.2.4.17.
137 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2013 AND 2014 NCAA FOOTBALL RULES AND
INTERPRETATIONS, Rule 9, § 1, art. 3 (2013).
138 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 106, at 65 (quoting NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2010–11 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK 4 (2010)).
139 See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 410 (2d ed. 2013).
140 See Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. 1997).
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ble care.141  In the context of collegiate football, a court would likely hold
the NCAA to a standard of providing reasonable protection to student-ath-
letes in the management and treatment of head injuries.
1. Prior to 2010
It is on the point of reasonableness that the NCAA’s concussion policies
fall short.  Between 2002 and 2010, the NCAA consistently failed to update its
concussion policies to reflect the consensus best practice standards for con-
cussion management.  In 2002, the first International Symposium on Concus-
sion in Sport was held in Vienna.  The symposium resulted in the publication
of consensus best practices in concussion management at the time (hereinaf-
ter “Vienna Protocol”).142  The Vienna Protocol advocated the importance of
a specific, stepwise return-to-play scheme, which provided that if any symp-
toms occur after exertion, the patient should drop back to the previous level
and try to progress again after twenty-four hours.143  The consensus also
found that “neuropsychological testing is one of the cornerstones of concus-
sion evaluation and contributes significantly to both understanding of the
injury and management of the individual.”144
The best practices developed in Vienna were affirmed by a second con-
sensus statement at the Prague symposium on concussions in 2004 (hereinaf-
ter “Prague Protocol”).145  The Prague Protocol added a specific
recommendation that baseline testing be adopted, particularly in high-risk
sports.146  Additional emphasis was also placed on the importance of educa-
tion, describing it as the “mainstay of progress in this field.”147  The state-
ment guides that “[a]thletes and their healthcare providers must be educated
about the detection of concussion, its clinical features, . . . and principles of
safe return to play.”148  Another important example of best practices, the
National Athletic Trainers Association (NATA) position statement, affirmed
the Vienna and Prague Protocols and added a recommendation that in most
instances athletes who suffer a concussion should be referred to a
physician.149
141 See Zalkin v. Am. Learning Sys. Inc., 639 So. 2d 1020, 1020–21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
142 M. Aubry et al., Summary and Agreement Statement of the First International Conference on
Concussion in Sport, Vienna 2001, 36 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 6 (2002) (summarizing the Vienna
Protocol).
143 Id. at 9.
144 Id. at 8.
145 See P. McCrory et al., Summary and Agreement Statement of the 2nd International Confer-
ence on Concussion in Sport, Prague 2004, 39 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 196 (2005) (summarizing
the Prague Protocol).
146 Id. at 198.
147 Id. at 202.
148 Id. (emphasis added).
149 See Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al., National Athletic Trainers’ Association Position Statement:
Management of Sport-Related Concussion, 39 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 280, 282, 286 (2004) (pro-
viding the NATA 2004 Statement).
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In its Sports Medicine Handbook (“Handbook”) from 2002 to 2007, the
NCAA dismissed the specific stepwise return-to-play guidelines outlined in
Vienna and Prague, claiming that “[t]he duration of time that an athlete
should be kept out of physical activity is unclear, and in most instances, indi-
vidualized return to play decisions should be made.”150  Further, the NCAA
encouraged medical personnel not to rely on neuropsychological testing, but
rather to use “[their] clinical skills in evaluating the head injured athlete to
the best of [their] ability.”151  No mention is made in the Handbook of con-
cussion education techniques for players, coaches, or healthcare providers.
Up until 2010, the NCAA failed to recommend in its guidelines that athletes
who suffer head injuries should be referred to a physician.  The NCAA’s
refusal to update its guidelines to reflect the consensus best practices in the
Vienna and Prague Protocols, as well as the NATA 2004 statement was thus a
violation of its duty to provide reasonable care to protect student-athletes
against head injuries.
2. After 2010: Addition of the Concussion Management Plan
Requirement
Although the NCAA’s move to require all member institutions to keep a
concussion management plan on file is a step in the right direction, it still
fails to provide reasonable protections to student-athletes.  Based on internal
surveys, the NCAA is well aware of the deficiencies that still exist in its policy.
Survey results from head athletic trainers at 512 responding NCAA schools
indicate that only sixty-six percent employ baseline testing, less than fifty per-
cent require a physician to see all student-athletes, and perhaps most disturb-
ingly, that forty-one percent would allow a student-athlete to return to play in
the same game after a concussion.152  These results indicate that many indi-
vidual NCAA member institutions fall well short of meeting the standards of
the most current best practices.153
Because the policy lacks any enforcement mechanism, there is nothing
to ensure that member schools actually implement and enforce the concus-
sion policies they keep on file.  Without a centrally enforceable mandate
from the NCAA, some member institutions will continue to fail to meet the
standards of best practices in handling head injuries.  As evidenced by the
case of Derek Sheely,154 merely having a plan on file is not enough to pro-
vide reasonable protection to student-athletes.
150 See Report of Robert C. Cantu, supra note 20, at 50 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2006–07 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK 48–49
(2006)).
151 Id. at 51 (quoting NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 150, at 48).
152 See id. at 58–60.
153 See McCrory et al., supra note 101, at 556–59 (detailing current concussion investiga-
tion and management techniques).
154 See supra notes 1–20 and accompanying text.
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Given the conflicts of interest that exist for team physicians and student-
athletes in the context of diagnosing and treating concussions,155 the
NCAA’s current policy is unreasonable in placing the burden upon these
parties to prevent such injuries.  Without any type of oversight or indepen-
dence, doctors may continue to bow to pressure from coaches to return ath-
letes to play before they have fully recovered.  Currently, a school that fails to
enforce its concussion management plan is technically (it has never been
enforced in practice)156 guilty of a “secondary” level violation.157  Compara-
tively, examples of other secondary violations include where a coach inadver-
tently calls a recruit or communicates on Facebook during a no-contact
period.158  The NCAA’s policy thus provides no reasonable protection to stu-
dent-athletes—as long as each member institution keeps a concussion man-
agement plan on file, the NCAA does not provide any oversight to determine
whether its terms are enforced or adequate to meet best standards.
C. Potential Roadblocks for the Plaintiff’s Case
1. Causation
Perhaps the greatest challenge that the plaintiffs in Arrington may face is
the issue of causation.  The players must be able to demonstrate it is more
likely than not that the harms for which they are suing are the result of head
injuries sustained while playing college football.  The NCAA will almost
155 See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
156 See Nathan Fenno, Internal NCAA Emails Raise Questions About Concussion Policy,
WASH. TIMES (updated July 20, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/
screen-play/2013/jul/20/internal-ncaa-emails-raise-questions-about-concuss/. The
NCAA’s legislative requirement is merely that each school must have a concussion plan on
file. Id.  NCAA director of enforcement Chris Strobel stated in an email obtained during
discovery in the Arrington case that “the legislation was specifically written to require insti-
tutions to have a plan . . . not about enforcing whether or not they were following their
plan—except for those isolated circumstances of systemic or blatant violations.” Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  A school would be guilty of a secondary violation if it did
not have a plan on file.  Only in a drastic situation, where the NCAA could claim “lack of
institutional control,” could the NCAA bring an enforcement action for a school’s failure
to follow the plan on file. See id. David Klossner, the NCAA Director of Health & Safety,
stated in a deposition that the NCAA had never disciplined a member school regarding a
concussion management plan and was not considering doing so in the future. Id.
157 Id.
158 See, e.g., James Crepea, Auburn Releases Documents on Secondary Violations, USA TODAY
(Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/11/17/auburn-
athletics-releases-documents-16-secondary-ncaa-violations/3618235/ (“The [secondary]
violations ranged from impermissible calls by assistant coaches to improper use of Twitter
by a student manager to promote a recruit’s official visit to campus.”); Jeremy Fowler,
Florida Football Misuses Facebook, Commits Four Minor NCAA Violations, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(July 12, 2010), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-07-12/sports/os-florida-ncaa-vio
lation-facebook-0720100712_1_facebook-recruit-ole-miss (stating that “Southeastern Con-
ference schools . . . have faced secondary NCAA violations for coaches posting messages on
a recruit’s Facebook wall”).
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surely argue that the players may have sustained concussions at many differ-
ent points during their playing career—any time from Pop Warner through
high school.  Given the difficulty in diagnosing concussions, it may be prob-
lematic to show that injuries sustained prior to college were not a major
causal factor in the development of long-term effects that a plaintiff is
exhibiting.
There is no clear formula underlying the exact number of concussive
blows that lead to long-term head injuries.  The lack of clarity surrounding
the mechanism of these injuries adds to the challenge of the plaintiffs’ case.
Until very recent advances,159 CTE could only be conclusively discovered in a
post-mortem examination.  Further complicating the causal link is that many
symptoms of long-term head injuries—depression, dementia, dizziness, and
headaches—are not readily apparent injuries and may be suspect to claims of
being faked.
The issue of causation played a major role in prompting the settlement
of the recent class action lawsuit by former NFL players against the league.160
Former college athlete plaintiffs such as Arrington would likely face a similar
uphill battle to establish the direct causal linkage between their long-term
head injuries and the alleged misconduct of the NCAA.  The difficulty
presented by the issue of causation may provide the plaintiffs with an incen-
tive to accept a settlement offer from the NCAA in lieu of risking an unfavor-
able trial verdict.
2. Assumption of the Risk
The NCAA will be likely to contend that by passing its concussion man-
agement plan requirement and publishing it in its Sports Medicine Hand-
book,161 as well as through the media coverage devoted to the issue, college
football players have been notified of the risks associated with concussions.
The NCAA concussion policy also mandates that every member school have
athletes sign a statement in which they accept responsibility for reporting
159 See Gary W. Small et al., PET Scanning of Brain Tau in Retired National Football League
Players: Preliminary Findings, 21 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 138, 138 (2013) (noting that
while the initial sample size of the study is small and further research is required, FDDNP-
PET testing may offer a method of diagnosing CTE in the brain tissue of living former
athletes); see also William Weinbaum & Steve Delsohn, Dorsett, Others Show Signs of CTE,
ESPN.COM (updated Apr. 5, 2014, 6:05 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/
9931754/former-nfl-stars-tony-dorsett-leonard-marshall-joe-delameilleure-show-indicators-
cte-resulting-football-concussions (explaining that UCLA is in the “very early” stages of test-
ing a brain scan that “uses a radioactive marker to identify the signs of CTE in the living”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
160 For a discussion of the difficulties in proving causation for the NFL class action
plaintiffs, see David S. Cerra, Note, Unringing the Bell: Former Players Sue NFL and Helmet
Manufacturers over Concussion Risks in Maxwell v. NFL, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 265,
289–91 (2012).
161 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2013–14 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK 64
(2013), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4328-2013-14-ncaa-sports-medi
cine-handbook.aspx.
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head injuries to team medical staff, as well as a requirement to provide play-
ers with educational materials regarding concussions.162  By providing stu-
dent-athletes with information on the dangers of concussions and requiring
them to take responsibility, the NCAA will argue that student-athletes
assumed the risk that they might sustain long-term head injuries from playing
football.
An assumption of the risk defense may be plausible for the NCAA, how-
ever their education policies are relatively new and likely not effective
enough at informing students with concussions to absolve the association of
legal liability.  The Handbook is available online and distributed to the head
athletic trainer at all member institutions, but it is not provided directly to
student-athletes.163  Although students are supposed to take responsibility for
reporting head injuries, education programs are left up to the individual
member schools, with no oversight by the NCAA on implementation or
content.
Studies have demonstrated that the concussion education provided to
student-athletes is divergent, limited, and largely ineffective at changing play-
ers’ attitudes to promote the self-reporting of concussion symptoms.164
Internal NCAA surveys in 2010 found that only thirteen percent of all stu-
dent-athletes, and seventeen percent of athletes in high-risk sports such as
football, had been required to receive any concussion management educa-
tion in the previous two years.165  Just twenty-four percent of coaches
reported being required to receive any concussion management education at
all,166 in direct contrast to consensus best practices suggesting that players,
coaches, and medical staff all receive regular education.167
If student-athletes are provided with only very limited information about
the risks associated with concussions, it would be difficult for a court to con-
clude that they have assumed those risks for which they remain unaware.
Further, student-athletes cannot be asked to take responsibility for reporting
their own head injuries if they are inadequately equipped with the informa-
tion necessary to do so.  By placing this responsibility on student-athletes, the
NCAA is putting its students in a situation of direct conflict of interest
between maintaining their scholarships and their own well-being.168
162 Id.
163 See id. at 1.
164 See Emily Kroshus et al., NCAA Concussion Education in Ice Hockey: An Ineffective Man-
date, 48 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 135, 137–40 (2014) (finding that the NCAA’s general educa-
tion mandate was divergently enacted and resulted in no significant improvements in
knowledge).
165 See Report of Robert C. Cantu, supra note 20, at 60.
166 Id. at 61.
167 See McCrory et al., supra note 101, at 560.
168 See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
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D. The Scope of NCAA Legal Liability
Based on the difficult issue of causation for the plaintiffs, as well as the
NCAA’s incentives to settle the case, it appears improbable that the Arrington
lawsuit will go to trial.  Currently the entire structure of the NCAA sits on
shaky ground, as the association faces a major lawsuit challenging it on anti-
trust grounds,169 as well as internal pressure from players advocating for
reform.170  The NCAA thus has a strong incentive to settle the Arrington case,
as it very likely wants to avoid a drawn out trial with the associated negative
publicity and potential for damaging facts to come to light.  A trial verdict
also presents the risk that the plaintiffs will be awarded a far greater amount
than the NCAA might be able to achieve through settlement, plus the addi-
tional legal costs.
Over the past fifty years, it is “estimated that more than 500,000 men
have played college football.”171  The NCAA’s own injury surveillance system
has reported that more than 29,000 concussions were suffered in college
sports between 2004 and 2009, more than half of which occurred in foot-
ball.172  It was also found that the number of concussions reported was
increasing at seven percent a year173—a figure that may continue to rise as
awareness of the concussion issue spreads, given that the injury is consistently
underreported.174  Thus the pool of potential class action plaintiffs is stagger-
ing in size—thousands of former college football players have likely suffered
concussions during their playing careers.
Legal liability for long-term head injuries thus poses a major threat to
the NCAA.  The NFL’s considerable wealth allows it to insulate itself to a
degree, as it can afford to pay out large settlements in order to avoid admit-
ting wrongdoing and protect its brand.  By comparison, a settlement or judg-
ment against the NCAA would likely have a major reputational and financial
impact on an organization that has already been the subject of harsh public
criticism.175  It is critical that the NCAA takes a proactive approach and
169 O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. C 09–1967 CW, C 09–3329 CW, C 09–4882 CW, 2010 WL
445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
170 See Rachel Bachman, Northwestern Players Seek to Be Unionized, WALL ST. J. (updated
Jan. 28, 2014; 4:37 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023032777
04579348751496028342.
171 Kevin Vaughan, Did NCAA Ignore Concussion Issue?, FOX SPORTS (updated Nov. 5,
2013, 2:56 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/collegefootball/story/ncaa-concussion-lawsuit-
mediation-harder-time-than-nfl-defending-itself-110413.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See Kelly G. Kilcoyne et al., Reported Concussion Rates for Three Division I Football Pro-
grams: An Evaluation of the New NCAA Concussion Policy, SPORTS HEALTH (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 1), available at http://sph.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/06/04/
1941738113491545.full.pdftˇml (“[A]thletes, for various reasons, often underreport and
minimize the importance of concussion[s].”).
175 See generally BENEDICT & KETEYIAN, supra note 99 (exploring the “darker truths”
behind the operation of the NCAA); KEITH DUNNAVANT, THE FIFTY YEAR SEDUCTION (2004)
(detailing the symbiotic relationship between television, college football, and the NCAA,
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implements comprehensive reform to its concussion policies in order to bet-
ter protect its student-athletes.
IV. WHAT THE NCAA CAN DO: POTENTIAL REFORMS TO
CURRENT CONCUSSION POLICY
A. Give the Current Policy Teeth: Add an Enforcement Mechanism
While NCAA member institutions are currently required to have a con-
cussion management plan on file, the NCAA provides no oversight to deter-
mine whether the plan is actually implemented.  The NCAA should adopt
legislation that holds member institutions accountable to abide by the con-
cussion management standards that they adopt.
The NCAA should require member institutions to file a copy of their
plan with the NCAA’s enforcement division and provide that any failure to
implement the substance of the plan will result in at least a level II violation,
termed a “significant breach of conduct.”176  This would effectively treat a
failure to properly abide by a concussion management plan in a similar man-
ner to recruiting and eligibility violations.  Member institutions that fail to
remain accountable to their plans would be punished with penalties typically
imposed for level II violations, such as fines, competition sanctions, and
scholarship reductions.177
Recent changes to the bylaws have focused on holding coaches account-
able for NCAA violations by punishing coaches who fail to properly oversee
their programs.178  The use of head coach penalties as punishment would be
particularly useful to address compliance with concussion management
plans.  Since football coaches are often the primary party responsible for
pressuring players to return to play after a head injury,179 direct penalties for
and how this relationship fostered the game’s rise as a big business); Mary Grace Miller,
Comment, The NCAA and the Student-Athlete: Reform Is on the Horizon, 46 U. RICH. L. REV.
1141 (2011) (arguing that the NCAA in its current form is at least immoral, if not illegal,
and deeply in need of reform); Branch, supra note 100 (“[C]orporations offer money so
they can profit from the glory of college athletes, and the universities grab it.”).
176 NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 19, at § 19.1.2.
177 Id. § 19.9.5.  The “Core Penalties for Level I and Level II Violations” include compe-
tition penalties, financial penalties, scholarship reductions, show-cause orders, head coach
restrictions, recruiting restrictions, and probation. Id.
178 See Meaningful Penalties Align with Significance of Wrongdoing, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATH-
LETIC ASS’N (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/
meaningful-penalties-align-significance-wrongdoing (“The new structure enhances head
coach responsibility/accountability and potential consequences for head coaches who fail
to promote compliance within their programs.”).
179 See, e.g., O’Reilly, supra note 93 (“[T]eam physicians can face demands from
coaches . . . to return players to action prematurely.”); see also Brad Wolverton, Coach Makes
the Call: Athletic Trainers Who Butt Heads with Coaches over Concussion Treatment Take Career
Hits, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 2, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Trainers-Butt-
Heads-With/141333/ (describing reports from anonymous athletic trainers who allege
they were terminated from their positions after disagreements with coaches over the han-
dling of head injuries).
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violations of concussion management protocol would force coaches to think
twice before influencing return-to-play decisions, which rightfully should be
left to the discretion of the team doctor or athletic trainer.
If coaches, trainers, and athletic directors know that a failure to comply
with the terms of their concussion plans could expose their football pro-
grams to serious penalties, it would provide a strong incentive for all parties
to ensure that head injuries receive proper attention.  A football program
with a relatively relaxed culture toward treating head injuries would be
forced to choose between emphasizing stricter application of their concus-
sion plan or facing penalties that could reduce the competitiveness of the
program.180  Such an enforcement mechanism would harness the intensely
competitive atmosphere that surrounds college football to work in the best
interests of student-athletes—the players upon whom the game is built.
B. Require Independent Team Physicians
In order to eliminate the conflict of interest inherent for team doctors
who are also university employees, the NCAA should hire its own indepen-
dent physicians to handle head injuries.  A single physician could be assigned
to each college football game, with the sole responsibility of diagnosing and
treating players who exhibit symptoms of concussions.  The physician would
be able to exercise his professional medical judgment objectively, free from
the conflict of interest created by simultaneously considering the interests of
his employer and his patients, the players.
One practical objection to implementing a system of independent con-
cussion physicians to work college football games is cost.  However, the
NCAA could require each member institution to contribute annually to a
fund that would pay the salaries of the independent physicians.  Universities
could then build this cost into their existing budgets for medical staff and
trainers, as the independent NCAA-hired concussion physician would take
on some of the duties typically covered by team medical staff during games.
C. Require Mandatory Baseline Testing and Enhanced Limits
on Full Contact Practices
Baseline testing is one of the most important tools available to medical
professionals today in diagnosing concussions.  By requiring every player to
take a baseline cognitive exam before the season starts, a trainer or doctor
then has a basis of comparison for the results of a sideline test administered
to a player exhibiting signs of a concussion.  The presence of a baseline stan-
180 NCAA penalties, particularly the loss of scholarships and recruiting restrictions, can
have a major effect on football programs, as they limit the depth of the team’s roster as
well as the team’s ability to compete with other schools for recruits. See, e.g., Gary Klein,
USC Football, Coach Lane Kiffin Try to Weather Recruiting Storm, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/31/sports/la-sp-0201-usc-football-20120201 (“[T]his
kind of stretch without a full complement of scholarships has at least temporarily sunk
programs before.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-5\NDL513.txt unknown Seq: 30 28-MAY-14 8:25
2388 notre dame law review [vol. 89:5
dard allows for the characterization of small concussion-related abnormalities
that might otherwise pass undetected.181  Internal NCAA surveys indicate
that around two-thirds of responding schools already use baseline testing.182
By mandating that all schools implement baseline testing programs, the
NCAA can greatly improve on the ability of team doctors to diagnose players
during a game.  Given the variation in noticeable symptoms that may be
exhibited by a concussed athlete, as well as the tendency of players to under-
state or hide their symptoms, it is imperative that team doctors have an objec-
tive tool available to assist in diagnosis.
Among NCAA athletic conferences, the Ivy League has led the way in
addressing head injuries, recently implementing new rules to strictly limit the
allowed number of full contact practices.183  Under the new Ivy League rules,
during the season football teams may hold only two full contact practices per
week, compared with the NCAA limit of five.184  The new rules are specifi-
cally designed to limit the total number of hits that players are exposed to
over the course of a season.
The NCAA should follow the Ivy League’s lead and implement stricter
limits on the number of full contact practices that football teams are allowed
to conduct, both during the season and in preseason camp.  Over the course
of a season, one study has estimated that a college football player may sustain
up to 1444 head impacts, with an average of 6.3 head impacts per practice.185
While it may be difficult to limit the number of blows to the head a player
receives during games without drastic changes to the rules of play, limiting
the allowable number of full contact practices can immediately reduce play-
ers’ overall exposure to hits throughout the season.  Coaches may have to
adjust the way in which they teach the game and implement their playbooks
in response to the rule, but this is simply a necessary part of the evolution of
the sport in light of the growing understanding of the long-term risks associ-
ated with head injuries.
181 See TAMERAH N. HUNT, CRAM SESSION IN EVALUATION OF SPORTS CONCUSSION 36
(2013).
182 See Fenno, supra note 4.
183 Report of Robert C. Cantu, supra note 20, at 62.
184 See id.
185 Joseph J. Crisco et al., Frequency and Location of Head Impact Exposures in Individual
Collegiate Football Players, 45 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 549, 549 (2010).  It is important to note
that not all of these blows to the head rise to the level of what is considered a “concussive
impact.”  However, given the documented cases of CTE in athletes who were never diag-
nosed with a concussion, it is critical to place restrictions on the number of blows to the
head whenever possible. See Daniloff, supra note 59.  While the exact role of subconcussive
blows in the development of CTE is still being explored, exposure over time to brain
trauma has consistently been linked to the disease. See Christine M. Baugh, Chronic Trau-
matic Encephalopathy: Neurodegeneration Following Repetitive Concussive and Subconcussive Brain
Trauma, 6 BRAIN IMAGING & BEHAVIOR 244, 252 (2012).
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D. Education
The medical profession has consistently emphasized that education may
be the single most important component of any concussion management
plan.186  Even if the initial injury cannot be prevented, a detailed and well-
emphasized education program may provide athletes with the ability to bet-
ter recognize their symptoms and report them to medical personnel.187  Cur-
rent NCAA policy dictates that member institutions must have an education
component included in their concussion management plan.188  However,
the NCAA does not require any specific substance to the provided education,
only that there is an “annual process that ensures student-athletes are edu-
cated about the signs and symptoms of concussions.”189  Notably, there is no
requirement that student-athletes are educated about the potential long-term
effects of concussions or the dangers of continuing to play after sustaining
one.  Given the recent studies demonstrating the devastating consequences
of CTE in former athletes, it is imperative that athletes understand not only
the symptoms of a concussion, but also the absolute necessity of reporting
their symptoms, rather than hiding them.
The NCAA should develop its own detailed concussion education pro-
gram and require every member institution to provide the program for all
student-athletes, coaches, trainers, and team staff.  The program should
include exhaustive information on concussion symptoms, side effects, man-
agement, and potential long-term effects.  Particular emphasis should be
placed on the risks associated with returning to play before a concussion has
fully healed, as well as the risks of long-term brain damage as a result of
multiple concussions.  The only way to break the current culture of playing
through concussions in football is an education system that continually inun-
dates players with information about the associated risks, especially the dan-
ger of returning to play after sustaining a concussion.
In order to complete the program, players should be required to sign a
statement fully acknowledging their responsibility to report their own symp-
toms, as well as those of their teammates, to medical staff.  Coaches should
also be required to sign a statement acknowledging their obligation to refer
any player exhibiting symptoms to the team trainer.  Improving the concus-
sion awareness education provided to student-athletes is perhaps the most
critical reform the NCAA can make in its concussion policy.  A comprehen-
sive, detailed education plan is certainly within the capabilities of an organi-
zation that is well-known for micromanaging the lives of its student-
athletes.190  Even if the NCAA has held back from aggressively taking action
186 See McCrory et al., supra note 101, at 560.  “As the ability to treat or reduce the
effects of concussive injury after the event is minimal, education of athletes, colleagues,
and the general public is a mainstay of progress in this field.” Id.
187 See HUNT, supra note 181, at 121–22.
188 See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 19, at § 3.2.4.17.
189 Id.
190 See, e.g., Brad Wolverton, NCAA Adopts Changes Aimed at Streamlining Its Rule Book,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 20, 2013), http://chronicle.com/blogs/players/ncaa-adopts-
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to regulate concussions in an attempt to avoid legal liability, providing a com-
prehensive education plan would be unlikely to have any effect on whether
the NCAA could be held liable for players’ injuries.  If anything, the provi-
sion of better education about the risks of concussions would strengthen an
assumption of the risk defense by the NCAA.  The NCAA thus has every rea-
son to ensure that its concussion education programs are improved to pro-
tect the interests of its student-athletes.
CONCLUSION
The past decade has seen a marked increase in awareness of the dangers
associated with concussions in football.  While state legislatures and the NFL
have acted to address the issue at the youth and professional levels of the
game, the NCAA has refused to take meaningful action to protect the well-
being of its student-athletes.  The NCAA now faces litigation over head inju-
ries sustained by former football players as a result of its failure to adapt its
policies.  Given the magnitude of the concussion issue and its implications
for college football players, it appears that the way head injuries are handled
in the college game is going to change—the only question is whether the
NCAA chooses to be proactive enough to improve its own policies before
change is dictated by external forces.
The NCAA is failing in its legal and ethical duty to provide reasonable
protection to its student-athletes.  An organization that has been criticized as
exploitative of college athletes only furthers that reputation by refusing to
protect the health and safety of football players, while simultaneously enforc-
ing a rigorous set of rules to ensure that players do not receive any type of
“impermissible” material benefits that would violate their amateur status.  If
the NCAA is going to fulfill its mission of fostering the development of stu-
dent-athletes and preparing them to be contributing members of society
upon graduation, it is imperative that the association takes precautions to
prevent head injuries sustained while playing football from impairing players
for the rest of their adult lives.  Derek Sheely’s death highlights the poten-
tially tragic consequences of shifting the responsibility to address head inju-
ries onto coaches and players.  The NCAA must take leadership on the issue.
An organization built upon the promise of developing athletes into success-
ful leaders cannot survive if it fails to protect those students’ basic physical
well-being.
changes-aimed-at-streamlining-its-rule-book/32527 (describing the former NCAA “cream
cheese” rule, which prohibited the inclusion of spreadable toppings on bagels provided to
student-athletes).
